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Abstract Missions involving robotic space flight typically
have a way to change the software that controls the flight
system, or some part of it, such as an instrument, after
launch. Usually this is accomplished by uplinking small
sets of binary machine instructions and writing them to
known locations in memory. We present an approach, used
on the Aquarius mission, that involves replacing running
components of, or adding components to, the running
software at a higher logical level, specifically at the
software architecture level, and on the C++ rather than
machine-language level. This approach provides significant
advantages in flexibility, robustness, reliability, and
testability. We present the component-based flight software
(FSW) design features that enable these capabilities. We
then discuss the approach used to verify the robustness and
reliability of these techniques, and finally describe usages to
date. 1 2
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1. INTRODUCTION
Robotic space missions need to modify FSW after launch
for various reasons: to fix a software bug that is discovered
in operations, to accommodate hardware changes or failures
that necessitate different FSW behavior, to take advantage
of unanticipated science opportunities, and frequently
because the FSW was simply not complete at launch.
Modifications can be made to the running software, or to a
copy in spacecraft persistent storage, in which case they
take effect only when the modified version is loaded during
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a reset or reboot. In this paper, we focus on modifications
to the running software.
Modifications to the running software can be made in most
spacecraft flight systems and also in the FSW of
instruments that have CPUs. These modifications are
usually accomplished by uplinking files containing binary
machine instructions, typically a modified version of a
routine that is already present in the running FSW, and then
overwriting the original version of the function.
Such binary code patches are non-persistent; if the
spacecraft or instrument reboots, the original version of the
FSW is reloaded into RAM from some form of persistent
memory, and the modifications are lost. This is also true of
the approach on Aquarius which we present here.
Our FSW architecture is an object-oriented, component-
based architecture, implemented in C++. Each component
in the design plays a specific role, such as processing all
commands and telemetry to/from a particular subsystem, or
providing any needed interfaces to a particular piece of
hardware. Some components play an infrastructure type of
role, such as dispatching commands to other components, or
collecting telemetry from other components and formatting
it for transmission.
A run-time modification in our approach means either
replacing one of the running components with a new
version, or adding an entirely new component, one that
doesn't fulfill any of the existing roles of the architecture. A
replacement component may be only slightly different from
the old version, or it can be entirely different in terms of the
behavior it exhibits, possibly containing many new classes
and functions, and handling new commands, producing new
telemetry, or spawning new threads. This flexibility makes
FSW modification a tremendously powerful technique for
handling unexpected situations.
Our patching approach does not require the ops. team to
have knowledge of the layout of the code in the flight
computer memory, because we use the operating system's
loader to place the new machine code in memory and to
resolve references that the new code makes to functions in
the existing on-board code base. So the patching process,
and the new component itself, can be tested on target
machines with different memory layouts or sizes, or even on
Unix workstations. This makes the patching process much
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more robust and reliable. At least one mission has suffered
serious consequences because of poking an incorrect
address, and this would be virtually impossible with our
approach.
Aquarius is a compound instrument consisting of a
radiometer, scatterometer, and command and data handling
subsystem, the heart of which is a PowerPC processor that
runs the FSW discussed in this paper. The requirements on
the software include communicating with the spacecraft
through 1553 and high-speed serial buses, commanding,
monitoring, and receiving data from the two sub-
instruments, radar data reduction, and temperature monitor
and control. We present the FSW design in general terms,
leaving out any detail that isn't directly related to the
modification capability. A detailed discussion of the FSW
architecture in general is given in [1]. See [2] for an
overview and mission-level details of Aquarius.
The next two sections are aimed at FSW engineers who are
interested in understanding the details of how our
techniques work. Those more interested in the operational
and system aspects of this patching approach may prefer to
skip to the Verification or Applications section.
Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagrams are used
throughout. The diagrams are fairly intuitive, but readers
wanting to understand the fine points of this paper should
be familiar with the UML. A concise and readable
introduction to the language is given in [4].
2. MODIFIABLE FSW ARCHITECTURE
Understanding our running FSW modification approach
depends not on the details of the Aquarius FSW
architecture, but on the concepts and features of the
architecture that are driven by the modification
requirements. We present a view of the architecture that
concentrates on those aspects. We begin with a run-time
view of the FSW in operation, shown in Figure 1. In this
diagram, we have an Input component that plays a role of
routing incoming data (not shown) to a Command
component, which then distributes commands to other
components. Some of the components produce telemetry,
which is sent to the Telemetry component, which then sends
some form of the collected telemetry data to the Output
component, from which it leaves the system (not shown).
Now we move to a similar view of the running system, but
introduce some type information, in Figure 2. In this figure,
the connections between the components are shown as
typed interfaces. The Input component requires an
implementation of the interface MessageSink, through
which the data flows to the Command component, which
provides that interface. Commands are distributed to the
components that handle them through the Queue interface,
suggesting that commands may be processed on separate
threads, as they are in most cases. Components that
produce telemetry implement the TelemetryProducer
interface, which is required by the Telemetry component to
receive the data. The Telemetry component requires an
implementation of the MessageSink interface, which is
provided by the Output component.
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Figure 1 - The Running System
The System component is shown requiring an
implementation of the Clock interface, which in Aquarius is
provided by software that handles an external interrupt at
100 Hz. The Clock interface drives a scheduler in the
System component, which in turn distributes CPU time to
those components that are connected to the System
component through a provided Periodic interface
implementation.
The System component is shown providing CPU time to
some of the components, enabling periodic activities in
those components. This System component plays a unique
and crucial role in the architecture, as we shall see. It's
noteworthy that, though this diagram presents an accurate, if
abstracted, view of the running Aquarius FSW, it could as
well represent any member of a whole family of systems,
encompassing many flight systems, or indeed many
embedded systems.
In order to replace one of these running components, it is
necessary first to disconnect the component instance from
every other component instance in an orderly way, then to
instantiate the new component, and then establish the
connections between the new component and other
component instances (though it may be that the new version
has different types of connections to different components
from those of the original version.)
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implementations of the CommandDispatcher, Scheduler,
and TelemetryManager interfaces.
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Figure 2 - In Operation Mode
The disconnection and reconnection is accomplished using
a special set of interfaces designed for that purpose. These
are shown in Figure 3, which shows a different run-time
depiction of the same set of components. In this figure, the
component with CmpNVersion] is shown providing the
TaskOwner, CommandProcessor, TelemetrySource, and
Linkable interfaces.
By providing these interfaces, the component itself provides
the logic necessary to connect itself to the rest of the
architecture, or to disconnect itself from the architecture. In
order to provide these interfaces, the component requires
Our architecture uses two categories of interfaces:
operational mode interfaces, such as TelemetryProducer,
and architectural change mode interfaces, such as
TelemetryManager. As we discuss each of these groups of
interfaces, we refer to these categories of interfaces as
operational and architectural. In our UML diagrams, we
show the operational interfaces in green, and the
architecture change mode interfaces in aqua.
An important feature of the design is the abstract base class
Component, from which all other component classes are
derived. This Component class provides trivial, no-op
implementations of all of the architectural interfaces - that
is, any calls to the functions implementing the interfaces
have no effects, and return a value indicating success. In
this way, derived classes are not forced to provide
implementations of the architectural interfaces, and must
only override the base class' no-op implementation if they
need their version of the interface to actually have effects on
the architecture. We describe these effects in the following
paragraphs.
Command Processing Interfaces
Figure 4 shows the architectural and operational interfaces
involved in processing commands. A typical component
class, such as CmpNVersion] in the diagram, embodies the
fact that it can handle commands by implementing the
CommandProcessor interface, and overriding the trivial,
no-op implementation of that interface which is provided by
the Component base class. If a component doesn't need to
handle commands, then it doesn't implement this interface.
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Figure 3 - Architecture Change Mode
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Figure 4 - Command Processing Interfaces and Classes
Note also that each of the components that implement
CommandProcessor require an implementation of
CommandDispatcher. When the operation installHandlers
is called on the component, an implementation of
CommandDispatcher is provided with the call as one of the
arguments. This is an example of an interface
implementation hand-off, which is a common pattern
among the architectural interfaces. To establish command-
processing connections, the System component calls
installHandlers on the component. Then, for each
command that the component wants to process, it calls
installHandler on the given CommandProcessor
implementation, providing a command op-code,
CommandParser, and queue parameters. The
CommandDispatcher creates an implementation of Queue
and returns it (if all goes well).
Thus we see that the knowledge of which commands are
handled by which components resides in the component
classes themselves. This distributed model of information
about the architectural connections is a key feature that
enables the flexibility of this approach, and helps ensure
that components are independent of each other to the extent
possible. To be sure, the architectural framework imposes
constraints: for example, only one component will be
allowed to register a handler for a given command op-code
value.
When disconnecting a component, the deinstallHandlers
method is called, in response to which the component calls
deinstallHandler on the provided CommandDispatcher
implementation for each command type that it handles.
Components must guarantee that the deinstallHandlers will
deinstall any and all command handlers that the
installHandlers method did or could install. Successful run-
time modification depends on this property of components.
In operational mode, commands are received by the
CommandDispatcher and immediately validated, using the
CommandParser provided by the component that handles
the command. If the command parses successfully, it is
placed on the handling component's Queue.
Our command processing interfaces make a few
assumptions that are driven by our FSW design: the direct
use of the Queue interface as the mechanism of passing
commands reflects a design choice that might not be
appropriate in other similar architectures. Similarly, our
design choice to put command processing on separate
threads drove us to include a Scheduler implementation in
the parameter lists of the operations of the
CommandProcessor interface: this allows the component to
obtain a Queue for command reception and schedule a task
for processing that Queue at the same time.
Scheduling Interfaces
Figure 5 shows the interfaces and classes involved in
making and breaking scheduling connections among
components. Our architecture features three kinds of thread
run logic interfaces: Periodic, QueueReader, and Sporadic
(readers familiar with [3] will recognize some of these
interface names. Our interfaces are loosely similar to the
corresponding interfaces in the RTSJ.)
As with the command processing interfaces, the Component
base class provides a no-op implementation of the
TaskOwner interface, and only components that need to
schedule threads need override that interface. At
connection time, scheduleTasks is called on the component.
The component in turn, calls addToSchedule on the given
Scheduler interface implementation for each thread that the
component wants to schedule.
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Figure 5 - Scheduling Interfaces
At disconnect time, the descheduleTasks operation is called
on the component, which in turn calls removeFromSchedule
for each task that it scheduled previously.
Only Periodic tasks actually receive CPU time from the
Scheduler implementation in operational mode. However,
the Scheduler implementation in our design provides the
services of creation, initialization, and finalization of the
thread objects that actually run the given interface
implementations. The addToSchedule operations create and
initialize threads for the given run logic object, and the
removeFromSchedule operations finalize and destroy that
thread object. These interactions are not shown in our
diagrams. As with any of these architectural interfaces, the
modification process depends on the removeFromSchedule
operation undoing any of the effects of the addToSchedule
operation.
The operation addToSchedule for Periodic tasks allows the
component to specify the period, in clock ticks, and the
offset from the first tick, at which the Periodic's doCycle
operation is to be invoked. The implementation of Periodic
need only override that one operation.
In our design, the Scheduler interface implementation is
provided by the System component.
Telemetry Processing Interfaces
Our architecture supports two main styles of telemetry
production: active and passive. As shown in Figure 6, a
component that wants to produce telemetry must override
the Component base class' trivial implementation of the
TelemetrySource interface. In another example of interface
implementation hand-off, the parameter list of each of the
operations of the TelemetrySource interface consist of an
implementation of the TelemetryManager interface.
Components that are active producers of telemetry must
implement the registerlderegisterActiveProducers methods.
Again our design choice to use a Queue for passing
telemetry from active producers to the Telemetry
component shows in the interface: the QueueAttributes
parameter to the registerActiveProducer method is used to
create a Queue implementation, returned by the call, to
which the active producer sends its data, assumed by the
TelemetryManager to be in the form of objects of a class
that is an implementation of the TelemetryItem interface.
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Figure 6 - Telemetry Processing Interfaces
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Our TelemetryManager implementation supports two styles
of queue draining on behalf of active producers: a "keep
all" style, and a "keep only the latest" style. In the case of
an active producer of error notifications, the "keep all" style
is used, while for more typical producers of subsystem
engineering telemetry, the latter style is appropriate.
Passive producers provide the TelemetryManager with an
implementation of the TelemetryProducer interface. During
operations, it is the TelemetryManager that decides when to
query the producer object.
At connect time, the two register operations on the
component are invoked. The component in turn calls the
appropriate register operation on the TelemetryManager
interface. At disconnect time, the two unregister operations
are invoked on the component, resulting in calls to the
unregister methods on the TelemetryManager
implementation by the component.
The Linkable Interface
The architecture framework allows the definitions of other
interfaces among components in addition to the command,
scheduling, and telemetry interfaces provided by the
architecture framework. The framework provides support
for other interfaces using the Linkable interface. As we see
in Figure 7, the Linkable interface gives the component that
implements it the opportunity to link to, or unlink from, the
component given as the argument to the call.
As with the other architectural interfaces, the Component
base class provides a trivial, no-op implementation of the
Linkable interface. Components that need special
connections to some other component must override that
implementation. Implementations of the methods of
Linkable typically use the RoleFiller interface to decide
whether the component provided as the argument can
provide an interface that this component needs.
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In the Aquarius design, there are several cases of the
Linkable interface being used to provide special connections
between components. For example, we have a component
that provides an interface to the 1553 bus. The Telemetry
component needs that interface, so it implements the
linkToComponent operation with logic to see if the role of
the given component is the 1553 interfacing component,
and if so to ask it for the interface implementation. In
another example, a science data formatting and storage
component needs to connect to a component that is
responsible for communications with the radiometer in
order to get an implementation of an interface that provides
that instrument's data.
As with the other architectural interfaces, the
unlinkFromComponent operation must be the complete
inverse of the linkToComponent operation.
The Component Class Hierarchy
Having gained some insight into the architectural interfaces,
it's helpful to see an overview of the component class
hierarchy, shown in Figure 8. All four of the component-
provided architectural interfaces - CommandProcessor,
TaskOwner, TelemetrySource, and Linkable - are
implemented by the Component base class, in a trivial, no-
op way. This ensures that these interfaces can be exercised
on any component instance. As described in the previous
paragraphs, components that need to participate in
architectural activities, such as command processing, must
override the appropriate set of these four interfaces.
This diagram also shows the component classes
Component] and ComponentN. These classes serve as
examples of classes that establish the behavior of specific
roles (in this example role 1 and role N, whatever those
might be.) Suppose for example that role 1 is the role of a
component that provides command and control of some
specific subsystem, such as the Aquarius radiometer. Then
class Component] would implement nearly all of the
behavior needed to fill that role. However, Component] is
an abstract class because it fails to provide an
implementation of the interface Versioned, which is meant
to provide a notion of versions of the implementation of a
particular role.
The class Cmpl Version], derived from Component],
implements Versioned and is thus a concrete class, the class
that represents the launched version of the component that
fulfills role 1. The class Cmp] Version2 represents the class
that would be uplinked in order to replace that component
in flight. The class Cmp] Version2 could do as little as
merely implement the Versioned interface differently, or it
could override many of the classes and operations defined
in Component] and its constituent classes.
Figure 7 - The Linkable Interface
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Figure 8 - The Component Class Hierarchy
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The run-time management of the architecture is performed
by the System component. Referring to Figure 9, we see
that the framework class Architecture provides most of the
operations needed to establish or change the run-time
architecture of components. The only abstract operation in
the framework's Architecture class is createComponents.
That operation is abstract because the framework cannot
know what the set of components that are to be part of the
architecture is, nor the concrete types of the components.
The application-level class Architecture provides this
information by implementing the createComponents
operation.
The System component creates an object of type
Application::Architecture and uses it to manage the
architecture, both during system initialization and
finalization, and during run-time modification. In fact, the
process of modification consists of snippets of initialization
and finalization behavior.
Figure 9 introduces another architectural interface, a sort of
"meta-architectural" interface called ProviderAnnouncer.
This interface lets the architecture object query the set of
components in the architecture to discover providers of the
architectural interfaces CommandDispatcher, Scheduler,
and TelemetryManager. If it discovers providers, it can
then use the interfaces on the components that require these
providers. For example, if some component in the
architecture provides an implementation of
CommandDispatcher, only then can the Architecture object
invoke the methods of the CommandProcessor interface on
the components.
With that, we are in a position to step through the process of
run-time modification.
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Figure 9 - Architecture Management
3. FSW MODIFICATION PROCESS
As depicted in Figure 10, modification of the running flight
software begins with the operations team identifying some
reason for the modification. The reason might be to fix a
FSW bug discovered in flight (though the presence of bugs
in our FSW is highly unlikely), or to adapt to degrading or
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class and not in any of the classes that are already part of
the in-flight code base. This keeps the patch file smaller
and prevents wasteful uplinking and in-flight storage of
redundant template instantiations.
The patch module is then converted into a command script
and uplinked to the flight system. The uplink process may
take significant time and be done over multiple uplink
passes. The first command in the script informs the FSW
whether this module represents a replacement patch, or a
new patch, and, in the case of a replacement patch, the role
ID of the component to be replaced.
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Figure 10 - The Modification Process
Whatever the reason, the team must identify which
component in the FSW is to be modified, and the behavior
to be changed, or decide to install a new component, and
identify the new behaviors desired. Then the patch must be
implemented, by defining and implementing a new sub-
class of the component to be modified, and possibly also
new subclasses of the constituent parts of the component.
The patch and patch file are depicted in Figure 11. In
addition to the new classes needed to modify the
component's behavior, the patch contains a class that is
derived from the class ComponentFactory. In the diagram,
the example given is class Cmpl Version2Factory. The
patch file will also contain an object of type
Cmpl Version2Factory, and an integer variable sideEffect,
described below.
The patch is compiled and linked. The patch file itself, in
Executable and Linking Format (ELF), contains the
machine code and data segments for the new code only. It
can refer to objects and functions that are already part of the
code repository in flight, but it must not redefine those
objects or functions (that would result in multiply-defined
symbol errors at load time).
Also, when compiling and linking the patch file we
explicitly prevent the instantiation of C++ templates, except
for those that are defined only in the modified component
Figure 11 - Patch Modules
The FSW assembles the pieces of the module in a RAM-
hosted file system as a file. The command script ends with
a special command that tells the FSW that all pieces of the
module have been received and provides the checksum of
the module. Then, in the ValidateModule step in Figure 10,
the FSW computes a checksum over the entire module,
compares it to the ground-provided value, and rejects and
discards the patch if the checksums are not equal.
If the module is valid, and when the ground sends an
installPatch command, the FSW performs the
LoadAndCreate step shown in the diagram. If that
succeeds, the FSW has created (in the sense of C++ - a
dynamically-allocated object) an instance of the new
component class (class Cmpl Version2 in the example
shown in Figure 10), and it can then proceed to install the
new component instance into the architecture, shown as the
InstallPatch step in Figure 10.
Zooming in on the LoadAndCreate step, we see in Figure
12 that the System component calls the OS-provided load
function, the argument being the name of the ELF patch
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Figure 12 - Loading and Instantiation
module file. The OS loader then reads the file, resolving
references made by the code in the file to functions that are
already part of the code base, and also initializing static
variables defined in the load module. In assigning a value
to the variable sideEffect, the loader calls the static function
registerFactory on class FactoryRegistrar, which has the
effect of registering the module's component factory (of
type Cmpl V2Factory), with the FactoryRegistrar. Thus the
factory object becomes available to the FSW via the
getFactory function.
Having obtained the factory instance, the FSW calls
makeInstance on that object to create an instance of the new
component. The makelnstance method of Cmpl V2Factory
runs the constructor of the class Cmpl Version2. The
constructor may encounter errors, which the FSW must
check for by calling the getErrors method on the new
component. Every step of preparing for and installing a
patch is checked for errors, though we do not show all of
that detail in our diagrams.
After these steps, the FSW is ready to install the patch,
which means connecting the new component into the
architecture and then letting it run. This process is shown in
the sequence diagram in Figure 13.
I rv4f-uL- t Ira ~v.=vI ;li i:~"( r E v -rw m IFD Fltr : G 4irrmF ozr-4arn-r P2" ) [
;~S_IASE rlr
1
--
2 IE EIi 4EBM ( )
it rnat ruw]
I4: A r T-% 4o rra cz sr D zrNt( x IAar c==w 14c: C-F~rni" F r;-n m ac I Acl AaZrir
-7 4eicrI L IC L4z=r t 4 " 41 rAEB%rC- p, tr) -1-'rr
fe Friu 1 n( aP =r r Patch
Figure 13 - Installing a Patch
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The first message of this sequence is the pause operation on
the System component. That operation disables the two
interrupts that drive the FSW, the 100 Hz external interrupt,
and the 1553 bus interrupt. This allows the FSW, in the
context of the System component's architecture
management thread, to safely change data structures that
would normally be accessed from different threads in
operational mode. These data structures include the
CommandDispatcher's map of op-code to parser and
handler, the Scheduler's lists of run logic objects and
associated Thread objects, and the TelemetryManager's lists
of Queues and passive producer objects.
The second message in the sequence, the beginChange
operation on Architecture, has the effect (not shown) of
announcing to every component in the architecture that
architectural change mode has been entered. This tells the
components that they must be ready for calls on their
architectural interface methods, and also that the dynamic
memory allocation (C++ new) is now allowed (dynamic
allocation is forbidden in operational mode, a constraint that
is automatically enforced in the Unix build of the FSW by
intercepting malloc calls.)
If we are replacing a component that fills one of the known
roles, we must first find the old component and remove it
from the Architecture's map of component instances, and
then disconnect it, which is accomplished by the
disconnectComponent call on Architecture. That method
calls all of the unregister, deinstall, and unlink calls on the
architectural interfaces of the component being
disconnected, as well as the unlinkFromComponent method
of all components in the architecture with the old
component as argument. This assures that, after these steps,
no object in the architecture is referencing the old
component or any of its constituent objects. Error checking
is made with each step, and recovery operations undertaken
if errors occur, though these operations are not shown in our
diagrams.
Having disconnected the old component instance (if this is a
replacement patch), the sequence continues by adding the
new component instance to the Architecture's map of
component instances, and then calling the
connectComponent method on the Architecture object.
Figure 14 shows the sequence of operations made by the
connectComponent method. Here we see the architectural
interface implementations of the new component being
exercised, as well as the Linkable interface on all of the
components of the architecture. When the connection
sequence is finished, the endChange method is called,
which announces to all the components that the system is
transitioning from architecture change mode operational
mode.
The final step is to invoke the resume method on the System
component, which re-enables interrupts and starts the
system running in operational mode.
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Figure 14 - Connecting a Component
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During the entire uplink, validation, load and install
sequences, the FSW emits telemetry to keep the ops team
informed of the progress and status of the modification
operation.
Recoveryfrom a Failed Patch Process
Any step of the patching upload and installation process can
fail, and the FSW must be able to handle these errors. We
have not shown error handling in the sequence diagrams in
order to keep them simple. Following is a discussion of the
errors that can happen and the autonomous recovery steps
that the FSW takes in response to each.
Errors during uplink of the patch are detected by sequence
numbers in each message and by a checksum over the entire
patch. A corrupted patch will be discarded, and the patch
operation aborted.
Errors in the module itself, such as undefined symbols, or a
failure of the module to register a component factory at load
time, are detected by the FSW, and it discards the module
and aborts the patch operation.
If the constructor of the replacement or new component
detects an error, the new instance is deleted, and the patch
operation aborted.
The next step for a replacement is to remove the component
to be replaced. This is done using the unlinking and
uninstalling operations of the architectural interfaces. If any
of these calls fail, the FSW attempts to re-connect the old
component to the architecture, and aborts the patch
operation.
If the old component is successfully removed, the next step
is to link the new component into the architecture, using the
linking and installing operations of the interfaces. If any of
these operations fail, the FSW takes the disconnection steps
with the new component, and then re-connects the original
component (which is not deleted unless no errors occur)
back into the architecture.
The FSW reports success or failure of each step to give the
ground insight into the process. If any of the errors occur,
the architecture could be in a partially-functional state: e.g.,
unable to handle certain commands, and the ground would
need to carefully evaluate whether a reboot might be
prudent at that point.
Whenever the FSW attempts backup steps to recover from
an error, it finishes the patch operation by putting the
architecture back into operational mode and re-enabling
interrupts, regardless of whether or not the backup steps
themselves encountered errors. This is safe in Aquarius'
case because the FSW cannot damage the hardware, and so
we can allow the FSW to stay running in a degraded state in
the hope of getting information out to the ground about
what went wrong.
In the next section, we describe how we test all of the
failure scenarios we've just described.
4. VERIFICATION
The FSW modification process that we've described is
highly automated, and so involves many steps and
conditional branches in FSW logic. And since it involves
disabling the interrupt that allows the FSW to communicate
through the 1553 bus, it could leave the system in a non-
responsive state if something went wrong. Therefore it
was essential that we verify the correctness and robustness
of this process as exhaustively as possible.
We approached this task with several techniques, chief
among them testing, but also with code checkers, code
coverage analysis, and detailed code reviews. Our testing
included component- and architecture-level white box
testing, automatic generation of long sequences of
modification operations with injected faults, and system-
level tests that replace every patchable component and
introduce several entirely new components. We insisted on
code coverage of 100% for the parts of the System
component and other classes directly involved in
architecture modifications.
Component-Level White Box Testing
On the level of an individual component, we needed to
verify that each component class implemented its
architectural interfaces correctly, and also that the methods
implementing the architectural interfaces responded
appropriately to faults that could occur. For each
component class, we wrote a stand-alone test program that
exercised all of that component's architectural interfaces,
and caused them to encounter every error that they could
encounter.
To accomplish this, we developed special test component
classes called fault injectors, depicted in Figure 15.
Consider for example the operation
registerActiveProducerFaultIn on the fault injector class
FaultInjectorTlmManager: the callCount parameter
specifies the number of calls to the method
registerActiveProducer that will occur before that operation
will return a non-zero error count, at which time the
component attempting to register the producer is forced to
handle that error. The call count logic is necessary because
most components make more than one call to a register or
install operation, and we needed to make each one of those
distinct calls produce an error.
A component-level white box test program creates instances
of each of the fault injector classes, and then runs a series of
3 We considered adding a watchdog thread to re-enable the interrupts after
a time if the thread on which the architecture modifications were being
done never re-enabled interrupts, but decided that it was not necessary for
the Aquarius mission, because there is a watchdog on the spacecraft, and
the consequences of a reboot are not dire.
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Figure 15 - Fault Injector Classes
tests in which the fault injectors' methods are used to force
the component to handle every possible error that it could
encounter.
Automatic Test Scenario Generation
We developed a patching test harness with the goal to
determine the robustness of the patching system with
respect to faults while validating the connection and
disconnection logic for each component. Our approach
gives the ability to specify combinations of patchable
components and fault injections and perform software
patching under these fault conditions.
The test harness enables the user to choose permutations of
components picked from the set of patchable components,
where repetitions are allowed. Patching the same set of
components with different orderings puts in evidence any
dependency relations between connection and disconnection
operations. These dependencies can be in the form of
memory allocation and de-allocation issues, or unsafe
assumptions on the life of a shared object.
The fault combinations are generated as follows: For every
method specified in the fault injection component (see
Figure 16), we specify afault or nofault condition. The test
harness generates a user-specified number of test cases,
where each test case represents a random set of faults. The
set of patchable components are then patched with those
faults. Thus thousands of patch operations are made in a
randomly-selected order.
We specialize the FaultInjector component (see Figure 16)
with a patchable component type. A call to a FaultInjector
component method results in a call to the specializing
component's corresponding method. This method is called
with or without the inclusion of a fault, depending on
whether a fault was specified for the particular method a
priori.
The inclusion of faults during patching tests the ability of
the patching system to safely recover from faults associated
to the initialization and finalization of flight software
subsystems. It puts in evidence the dependencies between
the methods of a particular component.
For example, if installCmdHandlers had a fault and it was
called before linkToComponent, can linkToComponent
execute correctly given a fault in installCmdHandlers?
These dependencies are extracted more readily by executing
different fault injection scenarios. As a result, the flight
software system's resilience to unsafe patching operation is
verified.
System-Level Testing
We have a suite of system-level patching tests in which we
replace every patchable component and install several new
components. The suite includes successful patch
operations, as well as all of the failures that can be
generated when running the system as a black box, with
only the flight interfaces (the 1553 bus and the high-speed
serial bus).
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Figure 16 - The Fault Injector Component Template
To date, we have run these tests in two different
environments: one in which the only hardware we have is a
breadboard PowerPC that has a serial port, and a separate
board that provides Ethernet connectivity. In this
configuration, software simulations for the other boards that
make up the instrument's command and data subsystem are
run as part of the FSW image (by constructing the
architecture with simulation versions of the components that
interface to these boards.) The 1553 and serial buses are
simulated by Ethernet socket messages.
A variant of this stand-alone environment is running the
FSW on a Sun workstation. All OS-dependent constructs
are wrapped in C++ classes, and the differences among OS's
are hidden in the implementation of these classes. This
technique enables us to run a FSW image on the Sun that
exercises at least 9000 of the code in the FSW. In
particular, none of the patching logic is OS-dependent
(except for the OS's loader, and some subtleties of thread
behavior). Patch modules in the Sun configuration are
shared libraries.
The second environment is in the integrated command and
data subsystem. In that environment, a modified version of
the same commanding tool we use for simulation of the
1553 bus in the stand-alone environment sends commands
to a real 1553 bus. So we can use the same command
scripts in either the stand-alone environment or the
integrated command and data subsystem environment.
We've run these tests on engineering models as well as the
flight version of the subsystem.
As of this writing, the complete flight instrument has not yet
been integrated, though it will be within a few months.
When it is, we will run patching tests on that system.
5. APPLICATIONS
To date, the run-time modification capability has been
extremely useful in testing situations. It has enabled tests
on a system level that would normally be possible only in
white-box context, allowed rapidly prototyping design
modifications and problem fixes, and served other utility
purposes. Following is a brief discussion of some of the
applications of this capability to date.
(1) Writing the EEPROMs: Late in the development, we
realized that writing the EEPROMs using a patch
instead of the traditional serial port-based EEPROM
writing application would save us from having to
modify the flight hardware configuration to enable the
serial port if we wanted to write the EEPROMs after
the flight C&DH had been assembled. (This would
also open the possibility of writing the EEPROMs in
flight, though this is not planned.) Thus the EEPROM
Writer component was developed to write a flight
software image to either (or both) of the two on-board
EEPROMs. This component is not part of the original
flight software component configuration. It is itself
uploaded as a new flight software patch. There are
two on-board EEPROMs; one on the CPU board and
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the other on COM board. The EEPROM Writer
component is capable of writing to and verifying of
either EEPROM, selected via ground command. The
EEPROM Writer component, of class EepromCmp,
consists of an EepWriter, and CmdHandler classes, as
shown in Figure 17. During the connection process,
the installCommandHandlers method registers all the
new ground commands needed for uplinking a
complete FSW image, with unique op-codes and their
associated command parsers. The scheduleTasks
method adds the EepWriter object to the schedule as a
new periodic task with pre-selected priority. The
EEPROM writes must be timed carefully, and this
Periodic runs at 100 Hz to accomplish this. Once
installed, the EepWriter's CmdHandler object wakes
up on a series of ground commands to upload a new
flight image. The image is written to one of the
EEPROMs in chunks during periodic calls from the
Scheduler to the Eep Writer.
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Figure 17 - The EEPROM Writer Component
(2) CPU stress test: we uplink a new component whose
sole purpose is to waste CPU time at a high priority,
and to progressively use more of it as time goes on.
We want to make sure that the performance of the
FSW degrades in a predictable way. This patch is
called the CpuHog.
(3) Prototyping a different design of 1553 driver. We
wanted to optimize the driver, but we wanted to try it
out before changing the baseline and overwriting the
EEPROM, so we made a patch of the component that
contains the driver. After debugging the driver, we
decided to incorporate the new design into the
baseline.
(4) We had to make a change in the FSW timing of reads
from an analog accumulation register because the
board required more time than its specification said it
did. We made the modifications necessary in a patch
of the component that contains the interface to that
register, and, after some experimentation and
modifications (over several patch uploads), we settled
on the best fix and made it part of the baseline.
(5) In thermal testing, we found that a serial bus driver
chip became very noisy above a certain temperature,
and had to change the FSW to handle this, which
included disabling an interrupt and other changes.
Under extreme time pressure, we quickly put the fix
into a patch, tested it, and then incorporated it into the
baseline. Doing the patch let us test the fix in the
thermal chamber before having to write the EEPROMs
with a new edition of the FSW.
(6) Fault injection in system-level patching tests: we have
several components that intentionally fail at different
steps in the patching sequence so that we can test the
FSW's response to these failures.
(7) Cleaning up after and replacing a suspended task: on
one of our system test scenarios, we intentionally peek
an invalid address, which causes the thread that
handles the peek command to get suspended. We
don't want to reboot, so we uplink a replacement patch
for the component containing that thread. The
finalization process of the replaced component deletes
the original thread, and installing the replacement
creates a new one. In this case, we install a new
instance of the very same version of the component.
This could avoid a reboot in flight.
6. CONCLUSIONS
It is natural to question the necessity of the kind of
flexibility that our modification technique provides. After
all, once launched, a system can hardly change so much that
it would need major behavior modifications. With crossed
fingers, we hope this will hold for Aquarius, and that we
will never have to patch the FSW in flight. But should the
need to change our FSW in flight arise, in however
unpredictable a way, we are confident that our modification
capability gives us ample ability to adapt. Moreover, there
are a number of advantages to our patching method over the
usual poking of machine instructions directly into memory:
(1) The flexibility of our patching process greatly
facilitates test and development, as our list of
applications in the previous section demonstrates. We
have institutional requirements that FSW be readily
testable, and that it allow the efficient diagnosis of
unexpected conditions and faults. We think our
patching approach has allowed us to meet these
requirements in a more complete way than has been
done before.
(2) The relative ease of patching our approach enables by
allowing the development of patches at a higher
logical level than patching one function, and the
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automation of the entire process, has allowed us to use
patches more widely and frequently than we could
easily do with traditional patching, and this has helped
verify this capability much more extensively than we
might have otherwise been able to do.
(3) Delegating the loading of code and placement in RAM
of the code to the OS frees us to test the same patch on
several machines, with different memory layouts,
FSW versions (though patches must be compiled
against exactly the same versions of FSW libraries as
the running version is), or even with different
operating systems. This has allowed us to run many,
many thousands of patching operations as part of our
testing program, and again has contributed to the
reliability and robustness of our patching process.
(4) Our modification process allows us to significantly
modify the behavior of the FSW, well beyond the
behavior of an individual function. This will enable us
to handle fault conditions or other unexpected
conditions that require extensive and complex FSW
changes, without having to reboot.
Future Work
There are a number of areas in which we'd like to apply this
capability, and to expand it and its application.
(1) Larger Systems: This approach to FSW modification
has been used to date only for an instrument,
Aquarius, albeit a fairly complex compound
instrument. We feel that this approach would serve a
spacecraft flight system very well, and we hope to get
an opportunity to try it. The robustness of the
technique could have to be ratcheted up in this context,
but that is entirely doable.
(2) Software Fault Protection (FP): Often software errors,
or other fault conditions that result in unexpected
conditions in the FSW, result in a suspended thread.
In Aquarius, the FSW detects and reports suspended
threads, but takes no automatic corrective action. This
does allow the ground to recover without a reboot.
However, it would be a natural extension of the logic
to make the FSW automatically finalize and re-
initialize the component containing the suspended
thread. This could allow the FSW to recover from a
suspended thread condition in a very small number of
seconds, rather than the minute-plus times typically
associated with the reset or reboot of a flight system.
This in turn could significantly increase the robustness
of a flight system in short, time-critical phases, such as
orbit insertion, in which there is no possibility of
ground intervention because of distance. Also,
avoiding a reboot of a flight system could save many
hours of ops. team work in bringing the system back
into mission mode.
(3) Fault Diagnosis: Being able to automatically and
rapidly launch new or significantly different behavior
in the FSW could be used to rapidly increase the level
of visibility into the state of some subsystem or piece
of hardware. For example, if the FSW detected an
unexpected condition in some piece of hardware, it
might automatically launch a component that
performed special monitoring of that hardware, or that
accepted special commands affecting that hardware.
Even in our current implementation, it would allow the
ground to uplink and install special diagnostic
components in such a situation.
Overall, we believe this type of approach will become
widely used in flight software in the future.
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